Previous studies of event returns surrounding bank mergers show that banks gain value in megamergers and additional value when they absorb in-market competitors. A portion of these gains has been traced to the increased bargaining power of banks vis-à-vis regulators and other competitors. We demonstrate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan customers of the acquired institution. Wealth losses are greater when loan customers are credit-constrained, the loan customer is smaller, or the acquisition is an in-market deal. These findings reinforce complaints that the ongoing consolidation in banking has unfavorably affected the availability of credit for smaller firms and especially capital-constrained firms. Previous studies of event returns surrounding bank mergers show that banks gain value in megamergers and additional value when they absorb in-market competitors. A portion of these gains has been traced to the increased bargaining power of banks vis-à-vis regulators and other competitors. We demonstrate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan customers of the acquired institution. Wealth losses are greater when loan customers are credit-constrained, the loan customer is smaller, or the acquisition is an in-market deal. These findings reinforce complaints that the ongoing consolidation in banking has unfavorably affected the availability of credit for smaller firms and especially capital-constrained firms.
INTRODUCTION
Differences in relative bargaining power inevitably affect the outcome of bilateral negotiations. In banking, bargaining takes place in three arenas: between banks and their regulators; between banks and their customers; and between acquiring institutions and target firms. This paper uses event-study methods to investigate how presumptive changes in the balance of bargaining power engendered by merger announcements affect the benefits and costs that corporate customers are expected to encounter in dealing with an enlarged megabanking firm.
Gains in mergers arise either through efficiency improvements or through increases in market power (Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo, 2002) . Although bank merger announcements routinely project subsequent improvements in efficiency and diversification, statistically significant net increases in the market capitalization of the combining banks seldom occur. The value of the target stock usually increases, but this increase typically occurs at the expense of the acquirer's stock value (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Houston, James and Ryngaert, 2001 ).
However, mergers involving megabanks show a different pattern. The stock of megabank acquirers typically gains value when the acquirer announces an acquisition.
Moreover, the benefit increases with target size and is larger when the target was previously competing in-state (Kane, 2000) . Kane hypothesizes that megamerger gains arise in part from improved access to monopoly rents and regulatory subsidies. Whatever scale and scope economies might exist in production and distribution costs, mergers eliminate an actual or potential competitor, while increased size strengthens market presumptions that the institution is both Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) and, in future disputes 04-20-05 2 with customers and regulators, "Too big to Discipline Adequately" (TBTDA). Resulting increases in the market power of the bank and in the intangible value of the government's credit enhancement lower its funding costs and increase its market capitalization.
Evidence that mergers enhance the value of bank debt (Penas and Unal, 2004 ) supports this interpretation.
How megabank mergers affect the expected financing costs of established loan customers is the econometric focus of this paper. On the one hand, any newfound efficiencies in loan production and contracting might translate into lower borrowing costs, while the increased political clout of the post-merger entity would lessen the chance that its failure could force a longtime borrower to lose its intangible investment in favorable ties with bank officers. Looking at the 1984 collapse and subsequent rescue of Continental Illinois Bank, Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) provide evidence that customers' wealth falls and rises with fluctuations in their lending institution's financial health. In studies of banking problems in Japan, Korea, and Norway, Brewer et al (2003) , Bae, Kang and Lim (2002) and Ongena, Smith and Michalsen (2003) respectively show that bank problems and failures reduced borrower stock prices, especially for more dependent and poorer-performing loan customers On the other hand, mergers threaten to hurt at least some customers and can do so in three ways. First, post-merger staffing cuts may displace some (or all) of the particular officers whose favor the customer had previously cultivated. Surviving loan officers are unlikely to be aware of every important contact the customer has previously had with one partner or the other. Second, in eliminating a competitor the merger may curtail some customers' bargaining power. Lastly, an enhanced government guarantee would shift risk to the customer in its capacity as a taxpayer.
Studies of bank mergers in Norway, Belgium, and Italy indicate that bank mergers affect customer stock prices, relationship exit rates, and credit costs respectively. Karceski, Ongena, and Smith (2005) find that Norwegian bank merger announcements reduce the equity value of small publicly traded firms that are target customers.
Consistent with the hypothesized joint effect of large in-market mergers on competitive pressure and of reduced competitive pressure on customer bargaining power, the decline 04-20-05 3 increases with the size of the target bank. In the Norwegian environment, the stock prices of relationship customers of the acquiring bank increase.
A relationship customer is one that enjoys a history of successful contacts with a bank. Following Belgian bank mergers, Degryse, Masschelein and Mitchell (2003) find that target customers are more likely than acquirer customers to have their relationships terminated with their bank. These effects are more pronounced for smaller customers with no alternate lending relationships. In Italy, Sapienza (2002) finds that, contract interest rates on bank loans fall when banks with small shares of the local banking market combine. The contrary result is observed for mergers of large Italian banks. This differential finding for large and small bank mergers is consistent with the joint hypothesis that economies of scale exist only for very small banks and that, only when markets are competitive, are merger benefits shifted into loan rates.
These findings are consistent with studies that indicate that at the margin, after banks reach a threshold asset size, they channel an increasing proportion of the lending to large firms. This pattern implies that megabank mergers threaten to disrupt the availability of credit to small businesses. Studies by Strahan and Weston (1998) and Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (BSSU, 1998) support these concerns. Strahan and Weston find that, as a proportion of bank assets, small-business lending increases only when the merging banks are both small, while mergers between medium and large institutions do not noticeably move this proportion. BSSU find that small-business lending increases following a merger of small banks, but decreases when large banks To investigate how the sign of the net effect varies with merger characteristics and customer circumstances, this study estimates whether and how merger 04-20-05 announcements for the ten largest domestic U.S. bank mergers between 1991 and 2001 affect the value of intangible customer relationships at target and acquiring banks. On average, the stock prices of established corporate customers show no statistically significant announcement effect. However, once we control for salient merger and customer characteristics, significant effects emerge. These effects are consistent with the hypothesis that megamergers consolidate market power in particular market segments.
On average, target customers suffer in all four mergers where the partners show substantial geographic overlap. As predicted by the bargaining-power hypothesis, very large customers are undamaged and smaller customers of targets fare especially badly when the announcement indicates that managers of the target firm are not going to be treated as equal partners. Finally, losses prove most severe for customers that show evidence of being credit-constrained.
The paper has four sections. Section II summarizes the economics of bankcustomer relationships and lays out some testable hypotheses. Section III reviews the construction and properties of our dataset. Section IV outlines the methodology and Section V presents the results. Section VI concludes with a discussion of policy implications and opportunities for future research.
SOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTANGIBLE VALUE IN BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS
Modern banking theory emphasizes that the many and repeated points of contact a bank has with its established customers generate private information and mutual trust.
Diamond's delegated-monitoring hypothesis holds that banks either win access to inside information from good customers or uncover such information through analysis they undertake in the course of supporting and observing their customers' loan and deposit business (Diamond, 1984; Kane and Malkiel, 1965) .
Privileged information and a climate of mutual trust allow a bank to assess and price the risk of lending to a relationship customer more accurately than the bank's competitors can. In principle, abilities or capacities that create such extranormal returns are intangible assets. In each relationship, the relevant intangible asset may be portrayed 04-20-05 as a mutual claim to the capitalized value (R) of the reduced opportunity costs. The outcome of a bilateral bargaining process (BP) allocates R partly to the relationship customer (R C ) and partly to the bank (R B ):
(1)
Because R requires the cooperation of both parties, equilibrium R C and R B should each be strictly positive to avoid outcomes that would eliminate the counterparty's incentive to renew the relationship.
To derive testable hypotheses about the determinants of the intangible values R C and R B , we can model R and the differences in bargaining power as functions of a series of observable bank, borrower, and merger characteristics that might reasonably be expected to affect their relative bargaining power. Given R, the impact of a megamerger on a customer's R C depends on whether and how particular bank and merger characteristics might alter its bargaining power. The customer's bargaining power increases with its size and the extent to which the importance of the officers that have handled its business in the past promise to survive post-merger reorganization activity and decreases if the merger is expected to curtail the customer's ability to tap alternative sources of credit on fair terms.
DATASET CONSTRUCTION AND DESCRIPTION

Sample Construction
Our sampling procedure imposes four screens. First, we see ourselves as sampling from the universe of loan customers whose banks happened to participate in each of the ten largest combinations of U.S. domestic banks during 1991-2001.
In identifying bank relationships, Gande et al. (1997) and Narayanan et al. (2004) include all member banks in a lending syndicate. However, Yasuda (2005) (produces the final sample of 2,204 firm observations).
Financial companies are eliminated on the grounds that abnormal returns for these customers may be contaminated by changes in their prospects as competitors of the proposed mega-institution. The other sample reductions lessen distortions associated with nonsynchronous trading, the concurrent release of important idiosyncratic information, and potential outliers.
Variable Definitions
Merger and Market Characteristics. Takeovers raise "issues" of governance, whose resolution can be more or less friendly to target management. As Table 1 indicates, SNL DataSource characterizes six of the ten megadeals as "mergers of equals."
In merger-of-equals combinations (MERGE_EQ), it is anticipated that more managers of 1 The Dealscan database provides details of loans over $100,000 compiled from 13Ds, 14Ds, 13Es, 10Ks, 10Qs, 8Ks, and S-series (registration) documents that publicly held companies and those privately held companies with public debt outstanding file with the Securities Exchange Commission. Lead lenders in syndicated loans are identified from the LPC Dealscan database if the bank's role in the syndicate is characterized by titles such as arranger, co-arranger, administrative agent, agent or co-agent. Lead lenders typically hold the largest stakes in the loan syndicate and perform the origination and monitoring roles associated with the loan syndicate. 2 Firms that are customers of both the acquirer and target in a merger are classified as joint customers. Eliminating those firms that reappear in another merger does not materially affect our results.
target banks will survive in important roles than when the target is absorbed unequally.
To test whether the pre-existing relationship value of target customers is conserved more fully in merger-of-equal combinations, we define the indicator variable MERGE_EQ, which equals one in merger-of-equal deals and is zero otherwise.
Mergers may expand an acquirer's share of existing markets and/or expand its product line or geographic footprint. Microeconomic theory indicates that a sizeable inmarket acquisition is likely to enhance a megabank's market power. Seven of the ten megamergers may be described as in-state acquisitions. Four of these show enough market overlap to be designated in-market. INMARKET takes on the value one for customers whose bank engages in an in-market merger; zero otherwise. We classify the other six combinations as either a market expansion (two cases), or a hybrid (four cases)
based on the degree of deposit-market overlap. The final column of Table 1 lists states for which the combining banks each previously serviced at least one percent of deposits.
Assuming that in individual state banking markets a bank's deposit and loan shares are highly correlated, we define OVERLAP to be a zero-one dummy that equals unity for customers located in states in which both partners' have at least one percent of the deposit market. For example, Norwest and Wells Fargo overlapped in Arizona, Nevada, and Texas.
Customer Characteristics. The empirical literature provides a guide in proxying for the competitiveness of each customer's funding environment (CREDIT_CONSTRAINED). In the macroeconomic literature on monetary policy and credit contractions, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) show that small firms and firms with limited access to credit markets are more sensitive to changes in available bank credit. In the merger literature, Strahan and Weston (1998);
Berger et al (1998); Karceski, Ongena, and Smith (2005); and Sapienza (2002) show that firm size is among the best proxies for customer bargaining power. Kanatas and Qi (2003) also identify age. Houston and James (1996) and Detragiache, Garella, and Guison (2000) show that multiple relationships reduce hold-up costs and adverseselection costs. While size, age, and relationships are important determinants of hold-up costs, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that a firm must also have a financing need.
Consistent with these prior studies, we constructed the following measures:
04-20-05 8 SIZE: Log of asset size (in $million).
YRS: Log of number of years that the firm's stock had been trading publicly.
MUL_REL: Zero-one dummy variable that equals one only for customers that have multiple banking relationships.
PUB_DEBT: Zero-one dummy variable that takes on the value one for corporations with public bonds outstanding.
EFN: External Financing Needs, (defined as planned investment minus internally generated funding).
Based on the joint findings of the previous literature, we define a corporation as potentially "credit-constrained" when it lies in the less-favorable tail of the distribution of each of the last five variables, that is when:
YRS < log of 11 years, SIZE < log of $1 Billion, EFN > 0, and
A zero-one dummy variable (CREDIT_CONSTRAINED) assigns a value of one to customers that meet this five-way condition Table 2 reports the mean value of all variables defined so far for the all-customer sample and for the subsamples of target and acquirer customers. 
Sample Description
METHODOLOGY
Our paper focuses on the effects that megamerger announcements have on the stock price of corporations that have an outstanding loan at either or both of the target bank and its acquirer. For individual customers, a market model is used to estimate and cumulate Day-0 and Day-1 "Abnormal Returns" to arrive at the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR i ). Whether due to projected changes in R or bargaining power, these CARs 4 Pooling decisions are unlikely to impart a bias one way or the other. In addition to primarily being customers of banks involved in friendly mergers, joint customers are among the larger customers and by definition are not credit-constrained because they possess an additional relationship. They unlikely to be adversely affected by the merger whether they placed in the acquirer or target subsample. As a robustness check, we reran our regressions with a JOINT_CUST dummy. The dummy is always insignificant.
should capture whatever net effect the merger has on a borrower's R C . To investigate whether the effect is significant, CAR i is regressed upon proxies for the customer's relationship value (R i ) and bargaining power (BP i ).
Regression tests seek to approximate the following latent regression equation:
In estimating (2), the joint influence of R i and BP i is proxied by variables that exemplify merger and market characteristics that proxy for the post-merger disposition of target 
Our first strand of testing looks at whether differences exist in the means of CARs across subsamples composed of target and acquirer customers. The second and more important strand uses equation (3) to conduct two kinds of regression tests. Individual-coefficient ttests tell us whether we can reject the null hypothesis that some or all of the individual coefficients are zero. Covariance tests investigate whether particular coefficients differ across the customer subsamples. Target customers are significantly affected in three cases, while effects on acquirer customers are never significant. Target customers benefited in the marketexpansion NationsBank/BankAmerica merger, and lost value in the largely in-market mergers of BankAmerica with Security Pacific and Fleet with BankBoston. Table 4 estimates equation (3) 1 percent) . Differences between the target and acquirer customer subsamples 5 Averaging across the mergers-instead of across firms-also produces qualitatively similar results.
RESULTS
First-Round Tests
Regression Tests
6 These results are robust to different market-portfolio construction methods (equally-weighted and valueweighted) and to an alternate standardization of abnormal returns (dividing the abnormal return by the standard deviation of the prediction error). 7 The coefficient for TARGET * (1-MERGE_EQ) is -0.9 and that for TARGET * CREDIT_CONSTRAINED is -1.1.
are confirmed through covariance tests involving the interaction terms in Model 1. Ftests reported at the bottom of the table establish that coefficients for the market-overlap, in-market, and credit-constrained indicators differ significantly between the target and acquired subsamples.
8
In Model 1, the positive slope of the SIZE coefficient assures us that, for largeenough size, adverse effects from other circumstances are overshadowed by benefits of size. This is our strongest and most important result. In fact, aggregating across the customer sample as a whole after multiplying each firm's cumulative abnormal return by its market capitalization reveals a $47 billion increase in value for sample firms.
As Models 2 and 3 indicate, the positive coefficient on SIZE obtains significance only for target customers. For a target customer, the breakeven SIZE may be calculated as the value at which the positive impact of SIZE just equals the sum of the -2.1%
intercept and other relevant considerations. Using the coefficients from an unreported regression of target CARs on SIZE, the effect of the negative intercept washes out when SIZE equals about 7.4. This corresponds to a customer asset size of $1.65 billion, which is greater than the $1.5 billion asset size of the median target customer. Because firms represented in the CRSP and Compustat databases from which our target customers are drawn are disproportionately large, it appears that, in the typical megamerger, more than half of target customers suffer some discomfort.
Controlling for size and other characteristics, outstanding public bonds or multiple relationships also result in reduced customer value. This is possibly a reflection of the potential for megabanks to use their enhanced bargaining power to reduce the benefits customers previously derived from competing funding sources. As the banking industry continues to consolidate both nationally and globally, it will become increasingly important to size this discomfort and for society to consider explicitly whether and how to protect the interests of small and credit-constrained target customers in megamergers.
8 Introducing industry indicators in the models awards insignificant coefficients to the 1-digit SIC dummies. However, their inclusion decreases the standard error for the CREDIT_CONSTRAINED variable. Interacting TARGET and ACQUIRER with the constituents of CREDIT_CONSTRAINED as opposed to the composite CREDIT_CONSTRAINED variable supports the aggregation procedure.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Acquirers absorb all tangible and intangible items on the economic balance sheet of target banks. Intangible items include charters, strategies, managerial skillsets, andas emphasized here-access to established customers. In any repeat business, customer relationships are important assets. This paper studies whether and when stockholders of customer firms worry about whether, under the new regime, their borrowing capacity might decline or credit terms become more rigorous.
On average in the ten merger deals studied here, acquirer customers fared much better than customers of target banks. In our sample, target customers experienced significantly negative two-day returns in three circumstances. Small credit-constrained Variable definitions may be found in the Appendix.
The difference in means is tested using a t-test, and the difference in medians using a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
TABLE 3 MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS EXPERIENCED BY CUSTOMERS OF THE TARGET AND ACQUIRER IN INDIVIDUAL MEGAMERGERS
The z-statistic is determined as,
, where G is the number of positive parameter estimates, N p is the total number of parameter estimates, and P = .50 (the probability of a positive estimate). *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. The endogenous variable is the percentage cumulative abnormal return, CAR(0,1), for loan customers surrounding the announcement of a bank merger. Variables definitions are specified in the Appendix. tvalues are shown in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
